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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the ability of the most prominent models of belief-
dependent motivations to explain second-mover behavior in the investment (or 
‘trust’) game introduced by Berg et  al. (1995). In models of belief-dependent 
motivations, an agent’s utility is defined over outcomes (as in traditional game 
theory) and hierarchies of beliefs. Such models are, therefore, deeply rooted in 
psychological game theory (as pioneered by Geanakoplos et  al. (1989) and fur-
ther developed by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009).
For second-mover behavior in the investment game, the two most prominent 
models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite predictions regarding the 
correlation between second-order beliefs and behavior. According to the theory of 
sequential reciprocity as introduced by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) (and 
see also Rabin 1993) and extended by Sebald (2010), a generous transfer by the 
first mover (FM, he) is interpreted by the second mover (SM, she) as less kind if 
the FM is believed to expect a high back transfer in return. These models, there-
fore, predict that the pro-sociality of the SM  decreases in her belief about the 
payoff expectation of the FM. By contrast, the guilt-aversion model introduced by 
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and generalized and extended by Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg (2007) assumes that people experience a feeling of guilt when they 
do not live up to others’ (payoff) expectations. This model, therefore, predicts that 
the pro-sociality of the SM  increases in her second-order belief.
Given the conflicting predictions of the two classes of models, it is ultimately 
an empirical question whether the revealed pro-sociality of an agent increases or 
decreases in her expectations about the payoff expectation of the other agent. The 
previous studies investigating this issue—often obtained by employing variants 
of the trust game as the work-horse—provide mixed results: while some papers 
(as, for instance, Guerra and Zizzo 2004, Charness and Dufwenberg 2006 and 
Bacharach et  al. 2007) find a positive correlation between second-order beliefs 
and pro-social behavior, others [as, for instance, Ellingsen et  al. (2010), or Al-
Ubaydli and Lee (2012)] find no correlation, or even a (slightly) negative one.
This paper explores the possibility that the inclusive evidence reported in the 
previous studies is due to preference heterogeneity in the population of SMs. 
Some SMs may be mainly motivated by reciprocity, some others by guilt aver-
sion, and a third group of SMs might not react to others’ payoff expectations at 
all. If the former two groups are similar in size, then in the aggregate the positive 
correlation between pro-social behavior and second-order beliefs and the nega-
tive, one might simply cancel out. This could explain the no-correlation result 
obtained in several previous studies.
To investigate this possibility, we use a triadic (that is, a three games) design 
implemented within subjects. Our experimental design is intended to exogenously 
manipulate the second-order beliefs of SMs in the trust game and we use it to 
classify experimental SMs into behavioral types depending on how they react to 
the belief manipulation. In line with the previous findings, we find no pronounced 
effect of the induced shift in second-order beliefs in the aggregate data. More 
3
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importantly, while we find some evidence that (at least directionally) supports 
our hypothesis of the coexistence of guilt averse and reciprocal players, we do not 
find very clear evidence in support of our hypothesis that the no-correlation result 
in the aggregate data is caused by the heterogeneity in reactions. Overall, it seems 
that the behavior of SMs in the trust game is either not primarily driven by beliefs 
on the payoff expectations of the FM or that it is driven by more complex consid-
erations than those reflected in existing theories.
Turning to the related literature, the two papers closest to ours are probably Khal-
metski et al. (2015) and Attanasi et al. (2017). The former paper formalizes the idea 
that people might not only feel guilt from not living up to others’ expectations, but 
may also get pleasure from positive surprises. For the dictator game, their model 
predicts a positive correlation between transfers and expectations for guilt-averse 
dictators and a negative correlation for surprise-seeking ones. While the intuition 
for the positive correlation is the same as in our work, the intuition for the negative 
correlation is different—in their work, it results from the fact that lower expectations 
leave more room for positive surprises, while in our work, it results from the fact 
that FMs with lower expectations are considered as kinder. The work of Attanasi 
et  al. is more similar to ours in that both test the hypothesis that in a trust game, 
the SM’s choice may be affected by a combination of guilt aversion and reciprocity. 
However, while they test their home-grown model in experiments which either dis-
close or not disclose the beliefs elicited form trustees to the paired trustor (under the 
auxiliary assumption that disclosure induces a psychological game with complete 
information), we test existing theories by exogenously varying a design parameter 
(under the auxiliary assumption that our manipulation shifts second-order beliefs).
2  The experiment
2.1  Experimental design
2.1.1  The game
We employ a triadic (three games) design implemented within subjects to manipu-
late the second-order beliefs of SMs in an experimental binary investment game. 
The structure of the game is illustrated in Fig. 1:1 There are two players, an FM and 
an SM. The players start with identical initial endowments of $10 (all amounts are 
in Australian dollars). In the first stage, the FM decides between keeping the endow-
ment and sending the amount of $3 to the SM. If the FM decides to keep the endow-
ment, the game ends and both players receive their endowments of $10 as their final 
payoffs. If the FM transfers the amount of $3, this amount is multiplied by 5 and the 
resulting $15 are then credited to the account of the SM. Now, a random move by 
Nature determines whether the game stops. Stopping occurs with probability 1 − p , 
1 A similar experimental design has previously been employed by Strassmair (2009) in an across-sub-
jects study.
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and in this case, the FM receives the $7 that are left from his initial endowment and 
the SM receives her initial endowment plus the $15 from the transfer of the FM. In 
the alternative state, occuring with probability p,   the game continues and the SM 
can then decide on the integer amount x between 0 and 15 she wants to send back 
to the FM. The game then ends with the material payoffs as shown in the game tree.
The crux of our work-horse trust game consists in the random move by Nature 
after the FM’s sending decision. The game resembles a standard binary trust game 
if p = 1, as the SM can then make a back transfer with certainty. By contrast, for 
p = 0 , the game is reduced to a kind of dictator game (with the FM as the dictator). 
To manipulate the belief of the SM about the payoff expectation of the FM (condi-
tional on sending the amount of $3), we vary—across treatments—the probability 
p while keeping everything else constant. Specifically, the variable p takes on the 
values 50, 70, and 90% across our three treatments. Because we are interested in 
individual response patterns, every subject has to make a choice in each of the three 
treatments. For the FM this means that he has to make three binary decisions, one 
for each treatment. For the SM, we apply the strategy method; that is, subjects in the 
role of the SM are asked to make a decision regarding the back transfer assuming 
the FM made the transfer and Nature did not stop the game.
2.1.2  The observer
The experimental design is intended to manipulate the belief of the SM about the 
payoff expectation of the FM (conditional on sending the amount of $3). It is based 
on the following consideration: the lower p, the lower the chance that the FM will 
FM
KEEPS $3 SENDS $3






(move ω = 0)
[p]
CONTINUES THE GAME




can send x back:
x between $0 and 15
FM receives: $7 + x
SM receives: $25 - x
Fig. 1  Structure of the modified trust game
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receive some money back from the SM, the lower, therefore, arguably his payoff 
expectation conditional on making the transfer of $3, the lower, therefore, also 
the expectation of the SM on the payoff expectation of the FM. To verify that our 
treatment variation indeed influences beliefs in the predicted direction, we have a 
third player role in our experiment—that of an impartial observer. The task of the 
observer is to guess how much money the participants in the role of the SM send 
back, on average, to the paired FM assuming that the FM transferred the $3 and 
Nature did not stop the game. We elicit the beliefs of impartial observers to avoid 
the well-known problems associated with eliciting beliefs from agents that also have 
to make a decision.2
2.2  Experimental procedure
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experimental software 
CORAL Schaffner (2013). We recruited 180 students from a large university in Aus-
tralia via the ORSEE software Greiner (2015) to our 15 experimental sessions. At 
the beginning of a session, each participant was randomly assigned the role of either 
an FM, an SM or an observer and participants kept the role during the entire ses-
sion.3 In each session participants, where exposed successively to the three treat-
ments—facing each decision situation exactly once. The beliefs of subjects in the 
role of the observer were incentivized using the quadratic scoring rule. Subjects did 
not receive any feedback on the choices made by other participants nor on the out-
come of Nature’s move before all decisions were made. At the end of the experi-
ment, one of the three treatments was randomly selected for payment. The players’ 
actions as well as the move by Nature for that particular treatment were revealed and 
payoffs calculated accordingly.4 Each session lasted approximately 45 min. No par-
ticipation fee was paid and the average earnings were $14.30.
2 If beliefs are elicited before the decision is made, this might lead to an “experimenter demand effect”, 
or to a “consistency effect”: Subjects might condition their choice on the stated belief, because they 
believe that the experimenter expects them to do so, or actions might be shaped by beliefs just to be 
consistent. Fleming and Zizzo (2015) test the impact of the experimenter demand effect on choices in a 
different context and indeed find convincing evidence in line with it. By contrast, if beliefs are elicited 
after the choices than actions might influence (or cause) beliefs. This is often referred to as the “projec-
tion hypothesis”, or the “false consensus effect”. Bellemare et al. (2011) test the importance of the (false) 
consensus effect and indeed find evidence in line with it.
3 After session 10, we disposed the role of the observer, because we attained enough data to test whether 
our belief manipulation worked.
4 The SM decision was only revealed to the FM if the FM sent the $3 and Nature did not stop the game. 
Note that the information of the players at the terminal histories would actually matter under the notion 
of “guilt from blame” as modeled by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007). Guilt from blame is not consid-
ered here—see Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) for an application illustrating the principle.
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3  Behavioral types
To describe and distinguish individual behavioral patterns, we define four types 
of players—selfish (S), altruistic (A), guilt averse (G), and reciprocal (R) ones. 
Selfish SMs are assumed to be interested only in their own material payoff. Thus, 
their back transfer is predicted to be zero in each of the treatments. Altruists are 
assumed to care positively for the material payoff of the FM—independently of 
their second-order beliefs. Thus, they are predicted to send money back if the 
weight on the material payoff of the FM in their utility function is large enough. 
The behavior of the other two types is predicted to be affected by our treatment 
variation.
Our prediction for guilt-averse agents builds on the theory of ’simple guilt’—
as introduced by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and generalized and extended 
by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007). In this theory, players experience a util-
ity loss if they believe that they let others’ payoff expectations down. To see the 
implications of this theory for the current setting, consider the treatment with 
continuation probability p and denote the SM’s choice at her unique information 
set in that game by x(p). Let b1(p) denote the FM’s (initial) belief on x(p) and let 
b2(p) denote the SM’s estimate of b1(p) conditional on the FM having decided to 
send the $3 to the SM and on Nature having chosen to continue the game. Using 
this notation, we derive in Appendix A the prediction that at her unique informa-
tion set, a guilt-averse SM decides according to the utility function:
where G is a strictly positive guilt-sensitivity parameter that ‘measures’ the extent 
to which the SM is averse against letting the FM’s payoff expectations down, and 
where [y]+ is y for y > 0 and zero otherwise. It is important to note that with this 
functional form the SM’s inclination to send money back increases in her expecta-
tion about the payoff expectation of the FM (that is, in pb2(p)).
Reciprocal players are assumed to decide in accordance with the theory of 
sequential reciprocity as modeled by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and 
extended—by allowing for chance moves—by Sebald (2010). In Appendix A, we 
show that this theory implies that, at her unique information set, the SM is moti-
vated by the utility function:
where R is a strictly positive reciprocity parameter that ‘measures’ how strongly 
the SM is willing to react to a generous move by the FM by being generous her-
self. As is easily seen, with this functional form the SM’s inclination to send money 
back decreases in her expectation about the payoff expectation of the FM (that is, in 
pb2(p)).
To get to a prediction for our experiments we now assume that it is common 
knowledge that there are four types of SMs in the population appearing with 
known strictly positive frequencies, S agents who never send money back, A 
agents who send a fixed amount k for any p, G agents who behave according to 
(1)UG(x(p), b2(p), p) = 25 − x(p) − G[pb2(p) − x(p)]+,
(2)UR(x(p), b2(p), p) = 25 − x(p) + R[x(p) − 7.5][7.5 − pb2(p)∕2],
7
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the utility function (1) with known 𝜃G > 1 , and R agents who behave according 
to the utility function (2) with known 𝜃R > 2∕15 . What are the requirements for 
equilibrium in this case? Since the FM does not know whether he is paired with a 
S, an A, a G, or an R type, correct expectation means that b1(p) is the probability-
weighted average of the back transfers of the different SM types. Since the SM 
knows that the FM does not know which SM type he faces, b2(p) = b1(p) for all 
SM types. What does this imply for the (equilibrium) reaction of second-order 
beliefs to an exogenous change in the continuation probability? Proposition 1 
(proven in Appendix A) addresses this question:
Proposition 1 Consider two games (as displayed in  Fig. 1) characterized by their 
continuation probabilities p1  and p2, with 1 > p2 > p1 > 0. Assume that it is com-
mon knowledge that there are exactly four types of SMs in the population, S agents 
who never send money back (xS(p) = 0 for all p ), A agents who send a fixed amount k 
for any p ( xA(p) = k for all p ), G agents who behave according to the utility function 
(1) with known G > 1, and R agents who behave according to the utility function (2) 
with known R > 2∕15. Further suppose that the four types of agents have known rel-
ative frequencies S, A, G  and R in the population. Then the equilibrium involves 
p2b
2(p2) > p1b
2(p1), where pib2(pi) = ApixA(pi) + GpixG(pi) + RpixR(pi).
Based on the theoretical prediction (in Proposition 1) that pb2(p) is an increasing 
function of p, we now define our four behavioral types for the empirical analysis.5 
For each of these types, we assume a linear relationship between the continuation 
probability and the back transfer. Specifically, the back transfer of an SM of type i ∈ 
{S, A, G, R} is assumed to be a function of her unconditional altruism parameter ci 
and of a parameter mi which reflects how she reacts to our belief manipulation:
Definition 1 (Selfish Agent) An SM is said to be a selfish agent if her back transfer 
is always zero: cS = 0 and mS = 0, implying xS(p) = 0 for all p.
Definition 2 (Unconditional Altruist) An SM is said to be an unconditional altruist 
if her back transfer x is a constant positive amount independent of the continuation 
probability p: cA > 0 and mA = 0, implying xA(p) = cA for all p.
Definition 3 (Guilt-Averse Agent) An SM is said to be a guilt-averse agent if her 
back transfer x is an increasing function of the continuation probability p: cG ⩾ 0 
and mG > 0, implying xG(p) = cG + mGp—with mG > 0—for all p.
Definition 4 (Reciprocal Agent) An SM is said to be a reciprocal agent if her back 
transfer x is a decreasing function of the continuation probability p: cR ⩾ 0 and 
mR < 0, implying xR(p) = cR + mRp—with mR < 0—for all p.
(3)xi(p) = ci + mip
5 Below we verify that the assumption that pb2(p) is an increasing function of p is not only in line with 
theory but also consistent with the data collected from FMs, SMs, and observers in our experiment.
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4  Data and results
In total, we collected data from 180 students—70 subjects in the role of the FM, 
70 subjects in the role of the SM, and 40 subjects in the role of the observer. 
Since each subject made a decision in each of the three treatments, we have 210 
observations for the role of the FM, 210 observations for the role of the SM, and 
120 observations for the role of the observer.
4.1  The observer
To confirm the validity of our experimental belief manipulation, we first 
look at the data obtained from subjects in the role of the observer. Observ-
ers were asked for a guess of the average x(p), which is a back-transfer con-
ditional on the FM having transferred the $3 and nature having decided to 
continue the game. We are, however, interested in preferences which are influ-
enced by the (belief of the SM on the) payoff expectation of the FM condi-
tional only on the own decision (of sending the $3). To obtain information on 
this expectation, we multiply the elicited joint conditional belief of the observ-
ers by the continuation probability p. The resulting number, pb1
o
(p) , estimated 
from the average of observers’ guesses, b1
o
(p) , is significantly increasing in p: 
0.5b1
o
(0.5) = 2.07 < 0.7b1
o
(0.7) = 3.12 < 0.9b1
o
(0.9) = 4.09 (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, p values < 0.01 ). Assuming that observers’ beliefs are a good approximation 
of FMs’ first-order beliefs, b1(p) , and SMs’ second-order beliefs, b2(p) , we inter-
pret this result as evidence indicating that our belief manipulation did what it was 
supposed to do.
Fig. 2  Left panel: fraction of FMs making the transfer for each of the three continuation probabilities. 
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4.2  The first mover
Turning to the data obtained from experimental FMs, the left panel of Fig.  2 
shows the fraction of FMs making the transfer for each of the three continuation 
probabilities. While only about 50% of FMs decide for the transfer in the p = 0.5 
version of the game, 74% of FMs do so in the p = 0.7 version of the game, and 
80% of FMs do so in the p = 0.9 version of the game. This is further evidence in 
support of our main hypothesis that the payoff expectation of the FM (conditional 
on sending the $3) is increasing in p. As can be seen from the right panel of 
Fig. 2, making the transfer pays off, on average, only when the continuation prob-
ability is 90%. This is due to the fact that for lower continuation probabilities (50 
and 70%), even though the SM sends back, on average, more than $3, the game 
does not continue often enough for the initial transfer to pay off on average.
4.3  The second mover
We now turn to our main data source, the data obtained from experimental SMs. 
First, we look at the average back transfer. It is rather similar across treatments. 
Specifically, it is $3.3 for p = 0.50 , $3.6 for p = 0.70 , and $3.6 for p = 0.90 . 
These numbers are not significantly different from those guessed by the observers 
in each conditions (t test, p values 0.16, 0.15, and 0.15 in each condition, respec-
tively). The corresponding proportions of funds returned are between 22 and 
24% of the maximal amount, which is below the average observed in trust games 
(Johnson and Mislin 2011 report an average of 37% of funds returned). Statistical 
tests confirm that average back transfers are not significantly different across treat-
ments.6 The corresponding Wilcoxon signed-rank test p values are 0.0822 for H0 : 
E(x|p = 50%) = E(x|p = 70%) , 0.3518 for H0 : E(x|p = 70%) = xE(x|p = 90%) 
and 0.0451 for H0 : E(x|p = 50%) = E(x|p = 90%) . Similarly, the distributions 
of choices do not vary across p. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test yields com-
bined p values of 0.959 for H0 : Φ(x|p = 50%) = Φ(x|p = 70%) , 0.959 for H0 : 
Φ(x|p = 70%) = Φ(x|p = 90%) and 0.751 for H0 : Φ(x|p = 50%) = Φ(x|p = 90%) . 
These results are in line with the no-correlation results obtained in several previous 
studies (see, for instance, Strassmair 2009, Ellingsen et al. 2010, or Al-Ubaydli and 
Lee 2012).
Looking at individual behavior, we next run a mixture model (Harrison and Rut-
ström, 2009), which allows us to estimate the fraction of subjects, whose choices 
are consistent with one of the types defined earlier. The mixture model allows dif-
ferent types to coexist in the same sample and it determines the support for each of 
the types indicating their respective importance in the population.7 To simplify the 
6 See Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and Cox et  al. (2010) for similar results in a slightly different 
context.
7 A look at the distribution of contributions conditional on each continuation probability shows that it 
is not unimodal—which supports the use of a mixture model. We thank one of the reviewers for recom-
mending to look for such a pattern in the data.
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estimation procedure of the mixture model, we decided to identify and exclude the 
selfish agents manually as they can easily be detected. We ended up removing 15 
individuals who never returned any money from our data set, and four agents who 
returned $1 once and zero otherwise. Hence, 27% of our SMs behave roughly in 
accordance with the selfish benchmark.8 Using the definitions in Sect. 3, we specify 
one likelihood function for the remaining competing types t ∈ {A,G,R}, conditional 
on the respective model being correct:
In this likelihood,  represents the density of the normal distribution and the three mt 
are restricted to correspond to each type of behavior: mA = 0 , mG > 0 , and mR < 0.
Our grand likelihood of the entire model is then the probability-weighted average 
of the conditional likelihoods, where t denotes the probability that the respective 
type applies and where lti is the respective conditional likelihood:9
Table 1 presents the resulting maximum likelihood estimates of the mixture model. 
The first finding is that the estimates for the probabilities of our type specifications 
are all positive and significantly different from zero. Their respective size refers to 







lnL(x, ct,mt, ,t) =
∑
i
ln[(A × lAi) + (G × lGi) + (R × lRi)].
Table 1  Maximum likelihood 
estimates of mixture model
† p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , **p < 0.01 , ***p < 0.001




t ln[(t × lti)]










8 We also run the mixture model including the selfish types, where they would form a ’neutral’ type 
together with the unconditional altruists. The higher likelihood was, however, reached by excluding them.
9 While we allow several types, we assume an equal variance across types which is similar to assum-
ing that the distribution of ’decision errors’ is similar across types. Mixture models face convergence 
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the fraction of choices characterized by each. The estimated proportions of recipro-
cal and altruistic types are very close, 27 and 29%, respectively (p value: 0.9359 for 
H0 : A = R ). In comparison, the proportion of guilt-averse types is with 46% fairly 
large and the difference to the other two proportions is near or within marginal sig-
nificance (p values: 0.1100 for H0 : A = G , 0.0815 for H0 : G = R ). Yet, looking 
at the estimation results reveals very flat slopes for both, reciprocal ( mR = −0.024 ) 
and guilt-averse types ( mG = 0.007 ). Figure 3 graphically illustrates these findings. 
It shows—for each of the three types—the plot of the estimated function of the 
back transfer on the continuation probability. Although there seem to be behavioral 
tendencies present, the effect of a change in the continuation probability seems to 
be rather weak, especially for guilt-averse agents. But also the effect for reciprocal 
agents is not very pronounced.
Given that the size of the effect of the change in the continuation probability is rather 
small for the different types, we do not interpret our results as providing clear evidence 
in support of our hypothesis of the coexistence of guilt-averse and reciprocal agents. 
The absence of clearly significant results with the mixture model may potentially come 
from a lack of power of this estimation approach. Mixture models’ likelihood functions 
tend to be rather flat. This can lead to imprecise parameters with large SEs. To get a 
better chance of finding clear evidence of individual heterogeneity in the reaction to 
second-order beliefs, we next try another approach. We estimate two versions of a lin-
ear regression model of the back transfer on the continuation probability. Our “random-
intercept” model allows only the intercept to vary between participants and reads
where xi is subject i’s back transfer, c is a constant, p is the continuation probability, 
and u0i is the subject-specific random effect. The “random-slope” model—allowing 
the intercept and the slope to vary between participants—reads
xi(p) = c + p + u0i + i,
Fig. 3  Plot of the estimated-type functions based on the estimates of the mixture model
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where u1i is the additional subject-specific random effect on the slope of p. The 
results for both models are reported in Table 2. The estimates of the “fixed” parame-
ters confirm the results obtained from the mixture model: the constant c is positive 
and significant but the effect of p on back transfers is insignificant. Our main interest 
lies in the results obtained for u0 and u1 as they represent the between-subject varia-
tion in the intercept and the slope of p,  respectively. The significance of u0 can be 
tested using the likelihood ratio (LR) test of the linear regression model in its 
restricted version of the random-intercept model. The null hypothesis that 2
u0
 is zero 
can be rejected at the 0.01% significance level (p value < 0.0001 ). To test the signifi-
cance of u1 , we again use an LR test. This time, we test the random-slope model 
against the random-intercept model. The p value is 0.2116, so that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that 2
u1
= 0 and thus that the slope of the back transfer as a func-
tion of the continuation probability p is the same for all subjects.
5  Discussion
We have experimentally investigated the empirical relevance of the most promi-
nent models of belief-dependent motivations for behavior in the binary trust game. 
Our triadic design implemented within subjects has allowed us to study individual 
response patterns to exogenously manipulated second-order beliefs. Results obtained 
from a mixture model allowing for reciprocal and guilt-averse agents as well as for 
unconditional altruists suggested that individual differences exist only in the level 
of exhibited pro-social behavior. The effect of the induced change in second-order 
beliefs on choices was found to be negligible—on average and on the type level. We 
have confirmed these findings by estimating two versions of a random coefficient 
xi(p) = c + p + u0i + u1ip + i,
Table 2  Mixed-effects 
maximum likelihood estimates 
of multi-level models
*p < 0.05 , **p < 0.01 , ***p < 0.001
Multi-level 
models (N = 
210)




Parameter Estimate Robust SD Estimate Robust SD
p 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007





2.746*** 0.262 2.456*** 0.359
13
1 3
Guilt averse or reciprocal? Looking at behavioral motivations…
model allowing the reaction of the SM to the belief manipulation to differ within our 
sample.
A possible explanation for our null result is that our experimental treatment vari-
ation did not do what it was supposed to do—namely, to manipulate the second-
order beliefs of experimental SMs. However, independently of whether we look at 
the behavior of FMs, SMs, or observers, we observe qualitative patterns in the data 
that strongly suggest that a higher continuation probability is indeed associated with 
higher payoff expectations of the FM and, therefore, arguably also with higher sec-
ond-order expectations of the SM—as predicted by the theory. We, therefore, con-
clude that our results suggest that the most prominent models of belief-dependent 
motivations—reciprocity and aversion against simple guilt—may not accurately 
reflect how players in the role of the SM in the trust game react to their beliefs about 
the payoff expectation of the FM. Further work is needed in this area to understand 
the role played by higher order beliefs for behavior.
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